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SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION:
USE OF DERIVATIVE TECHNOLOGY
FOR CREDIT TRANSFER
IAN BELL* AND PETRINA DAWSON**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Magazines are fond of lists, and none more so than specialist
magazines.  A particular favorite of specialist magazines is the listing
of their core subject matter in a “hit-parade” of success.  Legal maga-
zines love to publish yearly lists of the top 100 most profitable firms
and, no doubt (although the authors freely admit the subject lies some
way beyond their ken) lists of the 500 largest shippers of bulk fertil-
izer grace the pages of specialist chemical publications.  Magazines
dealing with the banking industry are no different and regular com-
petitive lists are hardy perennials.  However, those who have been
reading magazines aimed at the banking community over a number of
decades will have noticed a near universal shift in the manner in
which these lists of the current “best banks” have been set out.
Twenty or so years ago, although these listings contained much
information about the financial institutions that were lucky enough to
make it into their pantheon, the fundamental organizing principle was
“asset base.”  In other words, the “greatest banks in the world” were
ranked by reference to how much money they had lent.  This re-
flected the view of most banking executives, including the CEOs of
most banks, that a bank’s success was measured by size.
A quick glance at today’s magazines is likely to reveal a dramatic
change.  The same publications that ranked financial institutions by
their sheer bulk now compile the same lists on very different bases.
The chief organizing principle of the annual compilations will almost
* Ian Bell is Managing Director and Senior European Counsel, Standard & Poor’s Credit
Market Services.
** Petrina Dawson is Senior Managing Director and General Counsel, Standard & Poor’s
Credit Market Services.  The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone,
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always turn on some form of profit measure: it might be a straight-
forward measure such as an absolute dollar amount or a more subtle
measure such as return on capital or profit margins.  Balance sheet
obesity is no longer “in.”  Behind this editorial shift lies a fascinating
story of transformation in the banking industry over the last two dec-
ades which in many ways culminates in the more than $1.5 trillion
synthetic securitization market in the United States alone.
This article will briefly deal with the history that led to the
merging of securitization technology with derivative technology to
create the risk transfer machine that is the synthetic securitization
market and the business drivers behind it.  It will then seek to de-
scribe the most common forms of credit derivatives.  The article will
then set out the various forms of synthetic securitizations and their
advantages and drawbacks, before concluding with a description of a
classic synthetic securitization transaction.  In an article of this length,
one can do little more than flag the major landmarks leaving more de-
tailed analysis for a different forum.
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYNTHETIC
SECURITIZATION MARKET
A. Banks
To understand the development in banking of the last twenty or
so years it is important to keep in mind the simple picture of what is,
or as we shall see, increasingly was, a “bank.”  The term “bank” is
used here to refer to a deposit-taking and lending institution, there-
fore encompassing institutions that may have different legal forms
such as savings and loans institutions, mutual savings banks, and
building societies, but excluding classical “investment banks.”  A
bank is an entity that is good at locating people and companies that
have money they do not presently need, on the one hand and, on the
other hand, people and companies that have a need for money they
do not presently have.  The bank borrows the money from the former
(its depositors, lenders, and shareholders) and lends the same money
to the latter (its borrowers).  It pays the former for the use of their
cash and collects money from the latter for the use of the money it
has borrowed from the former.  The difference between what it is re-
quired to pay to the former and that received from the latter, post ex-
penses, represents the bank’s profits.  This is the classic paradigm of
banking where the bank intermediates the capital markets.
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A problem with this model is that the bank’s borrowers do not
invariably pay back their debts.  Even the most prudent bank will find
that at least a small proportion of its borrowers default.  However,
those who have lent the bank the money it used to provide loans to
these defaulting borrowers still have the right to be repaid.  Accord-
ingly, upon the first default by a borrower the bank would find itself
incapable of paying back in full the money it owed to its depositor.  It
would effectively be bankrupt.
This rather obvious problem is resolved by the bank creating a
cash reserve that is not, in the legal sense, borrowed from anyone and
therefore does not legally need to be repaid.  As the bank’s borrowers
default, this cash reserve is available to repay the depositors whose
money was lent to the defaulters.  This is done usually by two means.
First, the bank will, in the economic sense, “borrow” cash from per-
sons who are willing to agree that, in exchange for a higher fee, they
will not be entitled to their money (including their fee) if the bank
does not have the cash to pay them.  This is share capital and those
special lenders are “shareholders.”  Second, the bank will hold back
some of its profits in good years to increase its reserve of funds avail-
able to meet defaults by its borrowers.  This cash reserve is the bank’s
“capital.”
Although this almost insultingly simple description of a bank
may seem unnecessary in an article on the complex subject of syn-
thetic securitization, there is nevertheless value in keeping it in mind
so that, when looking at the extremely baroque complexities of this
field, one does not lose sight of the underlying simple architecture
which informs the whole complex scheme.
B. Securitization
Therefore, returning to our historical sketch, back in the early
1980s, bank regulators became concerned by the state of banks’ capi-
tal bases.  Driven by the belief that “big was beautiful,” banks were
lending more and more money on the same capital.  In particular,
they were lending considerable sums to sovereign borrowers with an
unhealthy concentration on three sovereigns: Mexico, Argentina and
Brazil.
Bank regulation, however, is a national prerogative.  This created
a dilemma for individual regulators.  If they insisted on a higher level
of capital for their home banks, these would legitimately complain
that, in the globalized lending market, they were being hobbled by
their own side.  Capital has an economic cost.  The more capital a
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bank is required to hold against its assets the more expensive it be-
comes to lend (i.e., the higher the interest rate it needs to charge its
borrowers to pay both its own lenders and its capital providers).
Since that bank’s product therefore becomes more expensive, its cus-
tomers (i.e., its borrowers) will go to the cheaper price provider:
namely the banks in the country whose regulators are less stringent
on the amount of capital their local banks require.
Regulators, governments, and informed spectators became con-
cerned that the political desires of governments to assist their local
banks would lead, or already was leading, to a competitive lowering
of the regulatory capital requirements by every major nation not dis-
similar to the competitive currency devaluations that had wrecked
world trade in the thirties.  No one would be willing to unilaterally
raise or even maintain the capital requirements of its own banks,
since to do so would be to cut them out of the world markets.  Thus,
the fear was that bank capital would be allowed to spiral ever down-
wards until a serious financial crisis threatened the whole world’s fi-
nancial infrastructure.  And, in 1982, this is exactly what happened.
The sovereign debt crisis led the world regulators to accept that the
only way to deal with the issue of bank capital was an international
agreement on minimum levels of capital required.  Between 1974 and
1983, under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements
headquartered in Basle, the banking regulators of the G7, with many
others as observers, worked out an agreement on minimum capital
requirements for their home banks.  Published in May 1983, the Basle
Concordat enshrined a minimum capital requirement of 8 percent of
risk-weighted assets.1  In other words, a bank was now required to
have at least eight dollars of capital for every hundred dollars it lent.2
The sovereign debt crisis and the Basle accords marked the be-
ginning of a transformation of world banking.  From then on, the
management of the capital base became one of the key management
tasks of major banks.  With the erosion of capital generated by the
sovereign defaults and the now mandatory requirement of Basle,
1. BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF
BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS (1983), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf
(last visited Apr. 2, 2002).
2. The agreement is considerably more complex as it provides that each dollar lent is not
treated the same way but weighted by perceived riskiness.  For example, money lent to OECD
sovereigns is weighted at 0%, i.e. does not require any capital to be placed against it.  Although
originally only a “gentlemen’s agreement” among the G7 regulators, most banking regulators
around the world voluntarily rallied to the Concordat.
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banks had no choice but to find ways to off-load their surplus assets.3
In addition, the shock to shareholders inflicted by the crisis and the
resurgence of a more free-market view of the economy and the role
of banks (away from the more traditional statist view of the role of fi-
nancial institutions that often prevailed outside the United States) led
to a much greater focus on return on capital.  This left banks with the
need to divest assets in order to free up capital to support losses on
some of the portfolio.  In addition, banks now started to focus on
those assets that did not generate profits commensurate with the capi-
tal held against them, all in the context of the need to maximize prof-
its and reduce capital requirements.
From this emerged a market based on the transfer of assets: the
securitization market, the primary benefit of which is diversifying the
risk of purchasing assets.  Investors were not as willing to bear the
risk of individual assets, but were willing to invest in a pool of assets
(with the appropriate protection for the risk).  Through securitization,
banks packaged up pools of loans and got rid of the risk associated
with them by selling them to the capital markets.4  Since one cannot
easily sell loan pools to an ever-changing group of securities holders,
this is usually done by selling the loans to a special purpose company
that funds the purchase by selling securities to the market.  Securitiza-
tion issues are always without recourse to the banks.  If the securi-
tized loans default, this loss is absorbed by the holders of the securiti-
zation bonds or loan notes, or to the extent available, the additional
assets held in the special purpose company.  This way the bank need
not reserve any capital for its securitized assets.
Another feature of the securitization market was that since the
banking crisis was nearing a global scale, it was not obvious for banks
that they could find any other banks willing to take on large quanti-
ties of now surplus loans.  Therefore, the banking community, while
developing an extensive inter-bank loan market from what was previ-
ously a miniscule market, had no choice but to turn to the non-bank
capital markets.  Securitization enabled the banking community to do
so.
In this manner, the banking system as a whole was able to focus
on tasks that the fragmented capital markets could not perform, such
as originating new credits and servicing those credits while removing
3. See generally First Boston, Asset-Backed Securities, in THE 1993 YEAR IN REVIEW
(1993).
4. JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE
THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE 3 (1988).
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the risks (and capital requirements) attached to them.5  It began to
move away from the paradigmatic form of a “bank” intermediating
the financial markets and turned itself into a sort of agent for the
capital markets, originating loans “on its behalf” so to speak.  In this
respect, securitization became a key component of the trend toward
the disintermediation of traditional banks, another aspect of which is
the way banks purchased and developed in-house investment banks
which specialize, inter alia, in managing bond issues for borrowers
without themselves lending.6
In the United States, securitization started primarily as a means
to create liquidity and to manage basis risk for banks who, in a period
of inflationary interest rates, found themselves with assets generating
3 to 4 percent (residential mortgages) while having to pay 9 percent
and higher on certificates of deposits and savings.  By 1986, the mort-
gage finance market was in full swing, and by 1987 the technique was
extended to auto loans, credit card receivables, and mortgage loans.
The United Kingdom soon followed with several mortgage-backed
transactions in the late 1980s.  The banks were able therefore to gen-
erate profits by originating the assets and servicing these securitiza-
tions, a model that proved very profitable for the banks.
Securitization requires the legal isolation of assets from the for-
tunes of the originator and the servicer.  Common law jurisdictions
are more securitization friendly, as they have few (or easy) formalities
for asset transfers, they recognize the concept of holding money or as-
sets in trust, and the formalities for asset pledges or security interests
are relatively straightforward.  This enabled lawyers to structure
transactions that gave investors the legal comfort they needed to price
the risk of the assets independent of that of the originator.  True secu-
ritizations, where available, are generally cheaper to the issuer.
In many civil law jurisdictions securitization is slow to develop
because of cumbersome formalities for asset transfer.  In many coun-
tries, the inability to perfect transfers other than by giving formal no-
tice through a bailiff each time a receivable arises, effectively frus-
trates both the economics and the legal structure of a securitization.
Therefore, securitization cannot develop until securitization laws are
adopted through the slow grinding of the political wheel.
5. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
OECD FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 37–72 (2001).
6. See id.
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C. Derivatives
Just as it forced banks to manage their capital proactively, the
sovereign debt crisis of 1982 and several subsequent crises, including
the emerging market crisis of 1998 and the U.S. saving and loans de-
bacle, stripped away the illusion that international banking was a safe
and rather pedestrian activity.  It also forced financial institutions to
manage much more effectively and nimbly not only credit risk, but
also other risks associated with lending.7  In the global and complex
financial world of the late twentieth century, the chief non-credit risks
were currency and basis risk.  The first reflected the fact that banks’
liabilities were not denominated in the same currency as their assets
so that a strong devaluation of the asset currency against the liability
currency meant that the bank would not be getting enough of the
former to pay the latter in full.8  The second addressed the fact that
the interest rate which banks had to pay to their lenders were not al-
ways calculated on the same basis as the rate which they received
from their borrowers.9  A U.S. bank may be paying its lenders an in-
terest rate calculated from the Federal Reserve Funds Rate, but be
lending the money to a German multinational and receiving a rate
calculated as a percentage over the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR).  Movements between these two could lead to the bank
losing rather than making money from its loan.
Out of this came the derivatives market.10  A “derivative” is a
contract where the payment obligations of the parties are derived
7. See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 20–23 (1997), available at www.bis.org/publ.bcbs20.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2002).
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. The International Financial Risk Institute defines the term “derivative instrument or
product” as:
 (1) A contract or convertible security that changes in value in concert with and/or ob-
tains much of its value from price movements in a related or underlying security, fu-
ture, or other instrument or index.  (2) A security or contract, such as an option, for-
ward, future, swap, warrant, or a debt instrument with one or more options, forwards,
swaps, or warrants embedded in it or attached to it.  The value of the instrument is de-
termined in whole or in part by the price of one or more underlying instruments or
markets.  Also called Contingent Claim.  (3) An instrument created by decomposing
the return of a related underlying instrument or index.  Examples include Americus
Trust and Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO) component instruments.  (4)
Occasionally limited to zero net supply contracts.  This restrictive definition excludes
warrants, convertibles and CMO components.  (5) In the financial press, any product
that loses money.
International Financial Risk Institute, Glossary Section, at http://newrisk.ifci.ch/00011123.htm
(last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
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from another set of assets or liabilities.  That other set need not re-
flect any real assets or liabilities but is a notional amount.  For exam-
ple, a simple interest rate swap requires Party A to pay to Party B in-
terest at LIBOR on a notional amount of $500 million while Party B
must pay Party A interest at Fed Funds on a similar notional amount.
The swap is a “derivative” since its obligations are derived from the
notional $500 million loan.  In turn, the notional amount will likely be
based on assets and liabilities held by one of the parties; in this case,
Party B is the U.S. bank hedging the basis risk on a $500 million loan.
The explosive growth of the derivatives market was seriously
hampered at first by the fact that each bank was using its own docu-
mentation.11  This caused two major problems.  First, it meant that
each time a financial institution wished to enter into swaps with a new
counterparty, it had to have its business and legal advisors pour over
and negotiate the counterparty’s non-standard contract.12  Second,
since all the contracts had slightly different terms, it was difficult for
any bank to know whether it had truly hedged its risks.13  For exam-
ple, Bank A (acting as a dealer) may have a swap with Bank B swap-
ping Fed Funds for LIBOR on a notional $500 million amount and
another with Bank C swapping LIBOR for Fed Funds on the same
notional amount.  The result should be for Bank A to have returned
to its original position before entering into the first swap.  However,
documentary differences between the two swaps meant that the
hedge could easily fail in certain circumstances.14  This could occur,
for example, if an event was a termination event under the first swap
but not the second and the damages payable on termination were in-
sufficient to allow Bank A to replace the terminated swap.
This issue was, if not resolved, made considerably less stressful in
1987, with the publication, under the auspices of the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), of a standard form mas-
ter agreement.15  This has since been followed by both new and up-
dated master agreements and definitions which form the basis of
11. See generally The Code of Standard Wording Assumptions and Provisions for Swaps,
1985 ed., AMERICAN BANKER, June 26, 1985.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See generally http://www.isda.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
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nearly all derivative trades, including those that underpin synthetic
securitizations.16
D. Credit Derivatives
Having used derivatives to handle non-credit risks and securitiza-
tions and the secondary loan market to handle credit risk, in the mid-
nineties banks began to use the derivative technology to manage
credit risk as well.17  A “credit derivative” is a contract where one
party’s obligation to pay is conditioned on the occurrence of a credit
event (usually a default) on another, sometimes notional, contract.18
The simplest credit derivative would be a “credit default swap” where
Party A agrees to pay to Party B the principle on a $100 million loan
to Company X if Company X defaults.  Party B may or may not have
lent money to Company X but Party A’s obligations are derived from
Company X’s performance under the $100 million loan.  As a means
of managing credit risk, the credit derivative products had certain
clear advantages over both securitization and secondary loan sales.
First, these latter techniques are often unpopular with borrowers.
Many large companies will relate with some bitterness how they bor-
rowed money from local relationship banks they had known for a
long time only to find that when they hit a difficult patch and had to
renegotiate their lending arrangements they were negotiating with
small regional Thai banks or hard-nosed New York “vulture funds”
that had purchased their loans in the secondary market and neither
understood nor cared about the companies’ future.
Second, buyers of securitization notes or secondary market loans
were not the traditional asset-based lenders.  Therefore, they did not
want to take the selling bank’s credit risk and required that the un-
derlying loans be sold in a transaction that was a sale or security on
the underlying loans.  Since, following the sale, the loans no longer
belong to the bank, the bank can only continue to service these loans
as some form of agent of the new owner.  Both the sale and the serv-
icing are document intensive, costly, and in some jurisdictions, diffi-
16. See ISDA Master Agreement 1992, available at http://www.isda.org/publications/1992
masterlc.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2002); and 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, avail-
able at http://www.isda.org/c1html#CD (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
17. See John P. McEvoy & Sunil G. Hirani, Challenges and Opportunities for the Credit De-
rivatives Market, J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT., Dec. 1, 1999, at 82.
18. See David Benton et al., Credit Derivatives Are Not Insurance Products, INT’L FIN. L.
REV., Nov. 1997, at 29.
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cult or even impossible.19  In other cases, the loan’s own documenta-
tion prohibits it.
Third, a bank may wish to sell only a part of its exposure to a
credit.  Partial loan sales however are cumbersome, not always legally
possible, and raise complex legal and administrative issues.  Con-
versely, a bank may want to remove its exposure to a particular credit
entirely or in a fixed amount.  That exposure may be made up of a va-
riety of instruments.  The bank may have a couple of bilateral loans
with the borrower, a few participations in syndicated loans, some out-
standing letters of credit, a trade financing overdraft facility, and
some currency swap exposures.  Some of these facilities fluctuate with
time, in sometimes unpredictable patterns.  Through a credit deriva-
tive, the bank can “sell” a fixed amount of exposure without having to
structure, document, and negotiate separate agreements for each type
of instrument.20  In that sense, credit derivatives are an extraordinarily
flexible and versatile way of removing credit risk.
E. Synthetic Securitization
This is where the two strands of our tale meet.  Through securiti-
zation the banking system as a whole had developed a method by
which it could focus on generating assets while at the same time get-
ting these funded by the capital markets—without capital require-
ments.  Through credit derivatives, the banks had crafted a supremely
flexible tool to remove (or, if they were the counterparty, acquire)
credit risk from their balance sheet.
The drawback of securitization was that it lacked flexibility and
was difficult to achieve in some jurisdictions.  The drawback of the
credit derivative market is that it was an inter-bank market (with mi-
nor participation by some extremely sophisticated and usually large
financial players, such as certain insurance companies).21  What was
required was the bringing together of these two technologies in order
to enable financial institutions to pass their unwanted credit risks on
to the capital markets, with all the flexibility associated with credit
derivative instruments.  This is exactly what synthetic securitization
began to achieve in 1998.  Its success can be measured by the growth
19. See generally Conrad G. Bahlke & Paul N. Watterson, Credit Derivatives 2000: Legal
and Regulatory Update, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Apr. 2000, at 1 (explaining that
these types of transactions were made legally possible in the U.S. after 1999).
20. Id.
21. See generally McEvoy & Hirani, supra note 17.
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of this financial product: in 1999, in the U.S. alone, it represented a $1
trillion market; by 2000 it had already grown to $1.5 trillion.22
III.  CREDIT DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
Being the underlying asset of synthetic securitizations, it is im-
portant to produce a basic taxonomy of credit derivative instruments.
Of course, the very flexibility that is their attraction also defies any
attempt at a complete description of all the possible variations which
can exist in the market.
Basically, a credit derivative instrument is a contract whose value
(or, in other words, the payment obligation of at least one of the par-
ties) is defined by reference to the performance of one or more third
parties, or the performance of one or more specific obligations of a
third party, or by the change in the credit quality of one or more third
parties.23
The third party whose performance is relevant is called the “ref-
erence entity.”  If obligations under the credit derivative depend on
the performance of a specific obligation, that obligation is called the
“reference obligation.”
Since these are credit derivative, the event that triggers or affects
one or more parties’ obligations is related to some entity’s credit.
Hence, such a triggering event is called a “credit event.”  The parties
are free to choose whatever events they wish to be credit events.  In-
deed, the issue of what events exactly will form part of the credit
events is usually the most fiercely negotiated part of any credit de-
rivative agreement.
The party who is entitled to a payment if some credit event oc-
curs, is called, for obvious reasons, the “protection buyer.”  The party
who has to make the payment is called, unimaginatively, the “protec-
tion seller.”  Much of the focus today is on whether protection sellers
fully understood the risk they were taking when “buying the risk,” or
whether the credit derivative transferred any risk at all.
This issue is not unique to credit derivatives—since Roman times
the expression “caveat emptor” (let the buyer beware) has been an
important element in contract law.  As the sovereign defaults in the
1980s sharpened the investor focus on true sovereign credit risk, cri-
22. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Bank Derivatives Report, Fourth Quarter
2001, tbl. at 7, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/deriv/dq401.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2002).
23. See Schuyler K. Henderson, Credit Derivatives, BUTTERWORTH’S J. INT’L BANKING &
FIN. LAW 332, 333 (1998).
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ses involving credit derivatives (such as Long Term Capital) serve to
expose the risks involved in these highly structured instruments.  The
market is just beginning to focus on the true risks of these instru-
ments, as for example, if one is unwilling to take the credit risk of
Company X, then it may not be appropriate to look to a swap with an
entity whose sole asset is stock of Company X as the perfect hedge.
Ultimately, no risk is too great if it is adequately priced for the inves-
tor and the greater the market for these instruments, the greater the
likelihood that the credit derivative will be priced adequately.
The vast majority of credit derivatives are documented under the
1992 ISDA Master Agreement by reference to the 1999 ISDA Credit
Derivatives Definitions, which expanded and revised the 1998 Long
Form Confirmation published by ISDA.24
Broadly, there are four types of credit derivatives: credit default
swaps, credit spread products, credit default notes, and total rate of
return swaps.
A. Credit Default Swaps
Under a classic credit default swap (CDS), the protection seller
agrees with the protection buyer that if a credit event occurs in rela-
tion to a reference entity or a reference obligation, the protection
seller will make a payment to the protection buyer.25  In the case of a
reference obligation, the amount is often, but not necessarily, equal to
the amount due under such obligation.  In exchange for this payment,
the protection buyer must deliver to the protection seller either (i) an
obligation of the reference entity in an amount equal to the amount
to be paid by the protection seller (either a loan or a bond), or (ii) an
amount of cash equal to the difference in the present market value of
the reference obligation (or, in the case of a swap based on a refer-
ence entity, a defined obligation of that entity) and an original
amount which may be the market value of the obligation at the time
the swap was entered into, the face value of the obligation, or some
other pre-agreed amount.26  The first method is called “settlement by
physical delivery,” while the second is called “cash settlement.”
In exchange for providing the protection, the protection seller is
paid a premium either upfront or over the life of the CDS.27
24. See generally ISDA Master Agreement, and ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, su-
pra note 16.
25. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 333–34.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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It is worth noting that, since this is a derivative, there is no rea-
son why the credit protection buyer should have an actual exposure
to the reference entity or be the holder of the reference obligations.
Clearly though, if the credit derivative is entered into in order to re-
lieve capital requirements, the buyer will have such an exposure or
hold the reference obligation.
The following example illustrates this point: Bank B has a $150
million exposure to Company X in the form of two loans.  It enters
into a credit default swap with Bank A.  Under the terms of the swap,
Bank B will pay quarterly premiums to Bank A.  If Company X is
subject to a bankruptcy filing (one of the listed “credit events” under
the swap), Bank A must pay Bank B $150 million.28  Since the swap
specifies “physical delivery” once payment is made by Bank A, Bank
B must transfer to Bank A one or more loans or bonds of Company X
in a face amount of $150 million.  Bank B can fulfil its physical deliv-
ery obligations by transferring the actual loans it was hedging to Bank
A.  However, these may not be assignable—hence the need for a
credit derivative to hedge them—and so Bank B goes to the market
and buys three now distressed bonds of Company X with a face value
of $150 million which it transfers to Bank A.
B. Credit Spread Products
The cost of borrowing for any entity will be a mixture reflecting
the base cost of “risk-free capital” plus a spread reflecting various fac-
tors; the key one being the entity’s perceived credit risk.29  The
amount over the risk-free interest rate which reflects the borrower’s
credit is the “credit spread.”  Credit spread products require the pro-
tection seller to make a payment to the protection buyer if the credit
spread of a reference entity (or a reference obligation) changes in a
pre-agreed way.  Since these products are typically used to remove or
diminish risk, payment is usually due when the credit spread widens,
thus indicating a perception in the market of a credit deterioration in
the reference entity.30  How the credit spread of a reference entity or
reference obligation is extracted from the actual spread is the subject
28. Id. at 334–37.
29. Claude Brown, Legal, Documentation and Regulatory Issues for Credit Derivatives, in
CREDIT DERIVATIVES & CREDIT LINKED NOTES: TRADING & MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT &
DEFAULT RISK 421, 423–25 (Satyajit Das ed., 1998).  Other factors would include the liquidity
of the relevant obligation and the quantum of political risk attached to the entity’s home juris-
diction.
30. Id.
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of much documentation, usually involving comparisons with “bench-
mark” credits and mathematical formulae.31  Issues such as by whom
and how often the credit spread needs to be calculated are also the
subject of serious negotiations.
In a classic credit spread product, upon the contracted change in
the relevant credit spread, the protection seller must pay the protec-
tion buyer a fixed amount (in the case of a reference obligation, usu-
ally equal to the face value of the obligation).  In exchange, the buyer
transfers an obligation of the reference entity, or the reference obliga-
tion (if physical settlement is chosen), or pays the seller the current
market value of such obligation (if cash settlement is chosen).
C. Credit Linked Note
A credit linked note (CLN) is a debt instrument that seeks to
replicate another debt instrument.  It can be used when the reference
obligation cannot be purchased by a particular investor (for example,
due to legal rules in the jurisdiction of the issuer of the reference ob-
ligation about who can and cannot hold domestic securities).  With
this instrument, the protection seller buys the CLN and in exchange
receives interest equal to the interest payable under the reference ob-
ligation and, at maturity of the reference obligation, receives an
amount of principal equal to that paid on the reference obligation.
If a credit event occurs on the reference obligation, the protec-
tion seller ceases to be paid but gets the reference obligation or value
thereof.  Since the CLN seeks to replicate another existing security,
credit events under CLNs often include events that are not technically
credit events for the reference entity but which, if they occurred,
would prevent a holder of the reference entity’s debt from receiving
payments (e.g., a custodian default, or a settlement system interrup-
tion).
In contrast with credit default swaps, CLNs would typically re-
quire the protection seller to pay an amount equal to the face value of
the reference obligation upfront.
D. Total Rate of Return Swaps
The total rate of return swap (TRORS) has sometimes been de-
scribed as a synthetic “repo” transaction.32  Under the TRORS, the
protection buyer pays an amount equal to the interest paid on a ref-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 425–26.
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erence obligation to the protection seller.  In addition, if the market
value of the reference obligation appreciates, the protection buyer
pays the increase value of the obligation.  In exchange, the protection
seller pays a pre-agreed amount reflecting some form of cost of funds
(e.g., LIBOR plus a spread).  Furthermore, if the market value of the
reference obligation declines, the protection seller pays the buyer the
amount of the decline.
Payments reflecting the appreciation or depreciation of the mar-
ket value may take place during the life of the TRORS or may take
place only at the maturity of the instrument.  If the maturity of the in-
strument coincides with the maturity of the reference obligation, the
protection seller would be expected to pay the face value of the refer-
ence obligation while the protection buyer would be expected to pay
the seller the actual payment under the reference obligation.  To the
extent the reference entity does not default, the amounts should net
out to zero.  If the maturity of the TRORS falls before the maturity of
the reference obligation, then one party will pay the other the change
in the market value, replicating the circumstance which would have
occurred if the protection buyer had sold the reference obligation to
the seller at the close of the TRORS and repurchased it at its matur-
ity—hence the synthetic repo tag.  With a TRORS however, the pro-
tection seller is not required to make a cash payment upfront equal to
the then value of the reference obligation.33
IV.  SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATIONS
There is, as of yet, no firm conceptual architecture for this rela-
tively new market.  We will divide the synthetic securitizations into
two clear categories however, namely, funded and unfunded.  Of the
two, the funded securitizations are the ones most closely resembling
the traditional securitization product in a synthetic form, while the
unfunded are closer to a hybrid between a true securitization and a
more straightforward credit derivative.
In the funded synthetic securitizations, the investors will part
with money at the outset of the transaction in the same way as they
would if they were purchasing bonds.  During the life of the transac-
tion they will receive periodic payments.  Although these can be de-
scribed legally as either interest or premiums, depending on the struc-
ture, they clearly play the economic role of interest but the higher
coupon reflects a premium for the credit derivative.  If all goes well
33. Id. at 425.
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for the investors, their money is returned on the maturity date for the
instrument.
In an unfunded synthetic securitization, the investors do not part
with money but merely stand ready to advance money if the pre-
agreed credit events occur.  During the life of the transaction, they
will receive a payment for this service.  Alternatively, they may re-
ceive this payment in full at the outset.  In some deals based on total
rate of return swaps, the investor may also need to make payments
during the life of the deal.
As described, there seems to be little difference between an un-
funded synthetic securitization and a straightforward credit deriva-
tive.  The main difference tends to lie in the fact that, as with a normal
securitization, in unfunded synthetic transactions there will be struc-
tural attempts made to remove the credit risk of the originator (in this
case the protection buyer) from the transaction.  For example, in a
synthetic transaction based on a credit default swap, the only pay-
ment that will need to be made by the protection buyer is the periodic
premiums.  If the buyer becomes insolvent, the protection buyer
would no longer be able to pay the premiums.  Since the protection
seller is not willing to take the credit risk of the protection buyer, it
may require credit support mechanisms to be set up to ensure that in-
solvency of the protection buyer will not affect its anticipated “profit”
for agreeing to take on the credit default risk that is the subject of the
swap.  Therefore, in a synthetic securitization there may be a provi-
sion that if the protection buyer’s current short term rating falls below
a pre-agreed trigger, the buyer must place an amount equivalent to
the net present value of the future premiums into a special account
which is secured in favor of the investor.  This special account is in-
vested to yield the equivalent of the premiums due under the credit
default swap and is then used to pay the investor.
However, there is no doubt that unfunded synthetic securitiza-
tions fall short of the traditional securitization product in a number of
key ways.  First, the originator/protection buyer cannot access the
general capital markets through unfunded transactions.34  The reasons
for this are relatively self-evident; to the extent that the origina-
tor/protection buyer relies on the investor to make a payment if a
credit event occurs, the former needs some degree of comfort that the
latter is going to be good for the money.  This cannot be achieved
with a traded instrument that may change hands at the whim of its
34. Id.
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present holder.  Should the original investor wish to trade the syn-
thetic instrument, how does the originator/protection buyer monitor
the sale so that the new investor is not some small bankrupt corpora-
tion?  In addition, if the unfunded synthetic instruments were similar
to traditional securitization bond issues, you would expect a multi-
plicity of investors owning each issue.  Again, it is difficult to see how
a practical system could be devised to enable the origina-
tor/protection buyer, upon the occurrence of a credit event, to track
down each holder of the synthetic instrument and make individual
demands for payment.
Finally, many synthetic securitizations are designed to relieve the
need for regulatory capital.  It is unlikely, to say the least, that any
regulator will grant capital relief to a bank for an unfunded synthetic
securitization unless that regulator can monitor whether the bank has
truly removed the credit risk attached to the relevant reference obli-
gation.  This requires the regulator to be able to assess the credit wor-
thiness of the investor or investors.  This is practically impossible to
achieve with an ever-changing group of capital market investors.
Accordingly, unfunded synthetic securitizations are invariably
done between an originator and a known counterparty.  There is usu-
ally only one investor to these transactions and it cannot “trade” the
instrument without the consent of the originator.
V.  FUNDED SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATIONS
A. Benefits of Funded Transactions
The area, therefore, where “true securitizations” take place in
the synthetic market, is the area of funded securitizations.  Here, as
stated above, the investors do part with money at the outset of the
transaction.
This initial payment by the investors does raise its own issues
though.  The one fact about securitizations, synthetic or otherwise, is
that they must, to the greatest extent possible, remove the credit risk
of the originator from the equation.  If the initial payment made by
the investors were paid immediately to the protection buyer, then its
repayment at the maturity of the instrument would depend on that
entity’s then current solvency.  This would contravene the essence of
a securitization transaction.
Equally, from the point of view of the protection buyer, the idea
behind a funded transaction is that it should remove the reliance by
that party on the solvency and willingness to pay of a multiplicity of
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ever-changing investors.  In other words, in the event of the occur-
rence of one of the pre-agreed credit events, the originator must
know that it can have certain and fairly immediate access to the
money due to it under the relevant credit derivative.
This conundrum is solved quite straightforwardly through the use
of the most common of securitization creatures: the bankruptcy-
remote special purpose vehicle.35  This vehicle is a traditional limited
liability corporation which has bound itself by covenants to the pro-
tection buyer and the investors (usually through the medium of their
trustee) that, among other things, it will not have any employees, rent
or own any premises, borrow or lend any money (other than pursuant
to the securitization transaction), or have any other activity or own
any subsidiaries.  In other words, it is a vehicle whose sole activity is
the relevant securitization transaction and which has, consequently,
forsaken any activity that could lead it to become insolvent.
It is to this special purpose vehicle (SPV) that the investors give
their money and not to the protection buyer.  It is in turn this SPV
which holds the cash to return it to the investors if no credit event oc-
curs or, alternatively, to the protection buyer if one does.  Since the
SPV is bankruptcy remote, the risk to both the investors and the pro-
tection buyer is reduced to a bare minimum.  It is also with the SPV
that both the investors and the protection buyer contract, so that it
stands as an intermediary between them.  In particular, this insulates
the investors to a large extent against any delays and difficulties
flowing from the possible insolvency of the protection buyer.
On the other side of the coin, since the rights of the protection
buyer to be paid in the event of a credit event’s occurrence are now
cash collateralized, most regulators are willing to grant the protection
buyer full capital relief for the reference obligation or the reference
entity since the credit risk on the SPV’s own payment is deemed to be
nil.36
B. Structure of Funded Transactions
A classic funded synthetic securitization proceeds as follows: the
originator/protection buyer (O) enters into a credit derivative with
35. This is not to say that unfunded transactions do not make use of special purpose vehi-
cles, but merely reflects the fact that in the case of unfunded transactions, their use is less onto-
logically necessary.
36. This treatment is in conformity with the rules of the Basel Concordat which weighs
credits backed by full cash collateral at 0%.  See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
supra note 1.  In other words, no capital needs to be set aside for cash-backed credits.
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the SPV.  This may be a credit default swap, a credit spread product,
a credit linked note or a total rate of return instrument.  Let us as-
sume for these purposes that it is a credit default swap (CDSorig).
The SPV then enters into a mirror credit default swap (CDSspv),
on the same terms as the CDSorig, with the investors.  To do this it con-
tracts with a trustee that acts in the same capacity as a bond trustee in
a more classical bond issue and is therefore the representative of the
CDSspv holders.
On entering into the CDSspv, the investors advance to the SPV an
amount ($P) equal to the notional principal under the CDSspv (which
is, of course, the same amount as under the CDSorig).
The SPV places $P in an account in its name with a bank of
suitably high credit quality.  The SPV also enters into a security
agreement whereby $P is provided as security to both O and the in-
vestors for respectively the SPV’s obligations under the CDSorig and its
obligations under the CDSspv.
Since $P placed in a bank account will not generate much in
terms of a return, it is common for the transaction documents to
specify that the SPV must invest $P either in highly rated securities or
in a repo transaction.  In the case of securities, the investments the
SPV is allowed to make are clearly specified so as to avoid currency,
interest rate or maturity mismatches.  In the case of a repo transac-
tion, the repo must be structured in such a way as to remove or mini-
mize the SPV’s reliance on the repo counterparty’s credit.
During the life of the transaction, O makes payments of premi-
ums to the SPV pursuant to the terms of the CDSorig.  The SPV in turn
passes on these premiums to the investors under its obligations under
the CDSspv.
The interest earned by the SPV on $P is either passed on to O or
to the investors depending on the deal that was originally struck.
If O fails to meet its payments of premiums, for example because
it goes into bankruptcy proceedings, then the CDSorig terminates, as
does the CDSspv.  The $P is then returned to the investors, who have
the equivalent of an early repayment.  This way, the investors are not
supposed to be vulnerable to O’s insolvency risk.
If a credit event occurs, O makes a claim under the CDSorig and
the SPV draws on $P to meet that claim.  The SPV in turn has a simi-
lar claim under the CDSspv.  However, the terms of the CDSspv allow
the SPV to draw down on $P to meet the investors’ obligation.  This
way, the SPV, and therefore O, need not concern itself with the then
credit standing of the individual investors.
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Following the credit event, O then needs to provide to the SPV
either a cash amount reflecting the then market value of the reference
obligation that triggered the credit event (if the CDSorig is structured
as a cash settlement transaction) or deliver to the SPV an equivalent
obligation of the reference entity (if the CDSorig is structured as a
physical settlement transaction).  The SPV will then either hand over
the cash to the investors or, if it holds an obligation, manage that ob-
ligation in accordance with the wishes of the investors, expressed
through their trustee.
If no credit event occurs, or if only a partial credit event occurs,
any remaining amount of $P is handed back to the investors at the
maturity of the CDSspv.  In addition, there is nothing in this structure
that prevents the reference entity or reference obligation from being
a pool of entities and/or obligations.  If the CDSorig is backed by a pool
of entities and/or obligations, it then becomes possible to tranche the
CDSspv into separate credit default swaps ordered by order of subor-
dination.  This reproduces synthetically the traditional tranching by
credit risk that one finds in traditional securitization transactions.
In a tranched synthetic securitization, CDSorig would be backed
by, for example, 100 separate reference obligations representing as-
sets in O’s banking book for which O seeks capital relief.  The SPV
would then enter into a series of CDSs with the investors (say, for the
sake of this example, five separate CDSs (CDSspv1, CDSspv2, et seq.)).
Everything would be the same as in the paradigmatic case de-
scribed above, save that the terms of CDSspv5 would provide that it
would meet all the payments due to credit events on the pool of ref-
erence obligations first, until its share of $P had been used up.  Only
then would the investors in CDSspv4 be called upon to meet any further
and incremental losses.
It is clear, in this situation, that the investors in CDSspv5 will be
bearing the first loss on the pool of reference obligations whilst the
investors in CDSspv1 would only be called upon in the case of a cata-
strophic meltdown.  Accordingly, the investors in CDSspv5 would re-
ceive commensurately larger premiums under their swap to reflect the
increased credit risk.
Usually, these separate credit default swaps will receive different
cascading ratings from the rating agencies reflecting the likelihood
that the investors will not receive their premiums and principal in full.
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DIAGRAM A
VI.  CONCLUSION
Through the use of synthetic securitization, the banking commu-
nity has made one further step on the road to disintermediation.  The
authors would contend, however, that it is not merely another small
incremental step, of which we have seen many since the early days of
securitization in the early 1980s, but a giant leap forward.  By marry-
ing the flexibility of the credit derivative market and its capacity to
preserve intact the basic banking relationship and the securitization
market’s access to an increasingly large pool of capital market funds,
the synthetic securitization market is the second great leap forward in
the road to a totally disintermediated financial world.
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